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ABSTRACT.

In terms of the history of modern economic growth the major
axis of world confrontation has always been between early and late
comers to industrialization.

Severe confrontation arises typically

when a late-comer country is believed to have developed a model of
economic development capable to

catch up

or even

economic power of the early-comer countries.

surpass

the

Rises and falls of

the various catch-up models in the modern history are examined.

In

this

is

historical

perspective

the

nature

of

confrontation

identified between the system of developmental market economies in
Japan and Asian NIES and the system of liberal market economies in
Western countries.

JAPAN IN THE NEW WORLD CONFRONTATION:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Along what axis of major confrontation will the world economic
and political system be structured after the demise of the cold
war?

In terms of the history of "modern economic growth" a la

Simon Kuznets (1966), I would predict that, as was always the case
in the past, the new axis of confrontation will be between early
and late comers to industrialization.
country (or countries)

To be precise, a late-comer

is bound to face confrontation with the

countries that accomplished industrialization earlier, when such a
country is believed to have developed a model of economic growth
capable to catching up or even surpassing the economic power of the
early-comer countries.

The communist bloc was able to establish

the status of being one major camp in world confrontation when the
"model of central planned economies" was hoped for and feared of
being able to "bury capitalism." However, it lost this status when
this model proved incapable of accomplishing the task.
An indispensable element of any effective catch-up model is a
mechanism of forced saving to enable accumulation of both physical
and human capital in the late-comer country at a much faster speed
than in the early-comer country. 1

The centrally planned economies

have tried to achieve this goal by government's direct command on
resource allocations.

In this respect,

the centrally planned

economies that existed in this century represent a development
model.

Not all the centrally planned economies are the development

model, however, since resource allocations with higher priority on
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"bread and butter" than on "iron and steel" are theoretically
possible under central planning.
In this perspective, the demise of the cold war is nothing but
the obvious failure of the centrally planned economies to be an
effective model of economic development for the late-comer to catch
up the early-comer country in industrialization.

For the future

prediction, it is critically important to understand that such a
failure is not new, but rather has been repeated throughout the
history of modern economic growth over two centuries.

Defeat of "Old" Developmental Market Economies

The first major confrontation between the early and the late
comers in the history of modern economic growth occurred when
Germany

tried

to

catch

up

to

England.

England,

which

had

established itself as the "workshop of the world" by the early
nineteenth

century,

followed

the

model

of

"liberal

economies" in the tradition of Adam Smith (1776).
ordinary

economic

activities

should

be

left

to

market

In this model,
decentralized

private decisions under competition of market, while government is
supposed to maintain law and order as a basic framework within
which market operates. 2
education and research,

Investments in human capital,

such as

were also left largely to the private

sector.
When

Germany

accomplished

national

unification

under

the

leadership of Prince Bismarck and set forth to industrialization,
government invested heavily in industrial infrastructure including
technical education and applied research/development,

while

it

installed tariff walls against imports of manufactured commodities
according to Friedrich List's
protection.

( 1841)

thesis of infant industry

This strategy was geared for accelerating capital

accumulation and economic growth by suppressing consumption by
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means of government finance and border protection, within the basic
framework of market economies.

As such, it was a development model

for catching up, which may be called the model of "developmental
market economies. "

By this model,

Germany was able to surpass

England already in the 1870s in the areas of heavy and chemical
industries.
Germany's success attracted other late-comer countries, Tsarist
Russia and Imperial Japan among others, to imitate the model of
developmental market economies.

It is important to note, however,

that the United States preceded Germany in the use of this model.
Following the advocacy of Alexander Hamilton, "the American System"
had been established by the first half of the nineteenth century to
protect domestic industries by tariff and to invest the tariff
revenue in public infrastructure, such as canals and highways, for
integrating frontiers into a single domestic market.

In fact, List

developed his idea of infant industry protection from his personal
observation on this "American System" in the Hamilton tradition
during his exile to the United States

(List,

1827).

Thus,

the

model of developmental market economies was universal in its appeal
and applicability to the late comers in the nineteenth century.
The problem with this model for Kaiser's Germany as well as for
Imperial Japan was that it was tied to narrow nationalism or racism
to

promote

imperialistic

exports abroad.

expansion

for

supporting

industrial

Since such ideology had no universal appeal,

expansionist policies inevitably resulted in isolation of these
nations in the world community.
German

Reichs,

as

well

as

In the end, the Second and Third

Imperial

disastrous defeats in the world wars.

Japan,

had

to

experience

The United States was able

to escape this route, partly because of its stronger liberalist
tradition

but,

also,

because

of

open

frontiers

available

for
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continued expansion in domestic market until the Spanish-A merican
War. 3
In retrospec t, while this "old" model of developme ntal market
economies was able to achieve success in fast economic growth and
catch-up,
it
failed
because
its
supporting
ideology was
incompati ble with the world system.

Failure of Centrally Planned Economies

Upon the defeat of old developme ntal market economies , centrally
planned economies became the forefront of developme nt models for
catching up.
This model was not only adopted in the communist
bloc, but also incorpora ted into many national developme nt programs
in the Third World.
Attractive ness of this model to developing countries was, in
part, based on ,,relativel y good growth performan ce of the Soviet
economy
planning

in

its

and

early

stage.

command can

be

Resource

allocation

by

relatively efficient where

central
income

levels are low and people's wants are homogeneo us so that it is not
so difficult to estimate demand and supply of commoditi es. Another
condition for effective working of centrally planned economies is
strong ideologic al belief to prevent people, especially leaders,
from free-ridin g and rent-seek ing.
nationalis m,

Communist ideal, coupled with

should have served this purpose,

for

the periods

during and immediate ly following the revolution as well as during
the war against Nazi Germany.
This model's attractive ness to the Third World was, also, based
on ideologic al appeal of socialism for the period immediate ly after
World War II.

For newly independe nt nations, capitalism and market

were perceived as a mechanism of colonial exploitati on.

Socialism

and central planning, which were said to serve·for people's common
well-bein g,

were a much more attractive system.

Unlike narrow
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nationalism and racism which led pre-war Germany and Japan to
isolation, socialist ideology was able to secure wide sympathy and
alliance from the world for the communist bloc.
However, centrally planned economies have a critical defect as
a

catch-up model.

While resource allocations can be decently

efficient under central planning in the low-income stage, errors in
planning increase progressively as the level of income rises and
people's

wants

diversify.

Also,

altruism

based

on

communist

ideology, which may be an effective enforcer of leaders' morals as
well as workers' morale under the crisis situation of revolution or
war, can not sustain for long in peace.
under

peace,

both

planning

errors

As the income level rises

and

rent-seeking

behaviors

accumulate to such an extent as to collapse the economy.

Thus,

centrally planned economies are bound to fail before attaining the
catch-up goal.
In my perspective, the communist bloc failed not because of its
ideology but because of the critical defect on its development
model. 4

Prospect for "New" Developmental Marketing Economies

The receding tide of centrally planned economies has coincided
with the rise of a new model which may be called "new developmental
market economies. "

This is the developmental strategy that has

been adopted by post-war Japan,

followed by Asian NIES such as

Korea and Taiwan, and later followed by ASEAN nations.
This model is similar to the old developmental market economies
of

pre-war

government

Germany
promotes

and
high

Japan

with

capital

respect

to

accumulation

the
by

fact

that

suppressing

consumption through strong regulations and administrative guidance
within the basic framework of market economies. 5

It is different

from the old model in the aspect that it is not tied up with narrow
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nationalism or racism.

Instead, the new model is implicitly based

on "developmentalism" or "production fetishism" by which people
judge whether or not certain policies are good and just in terms of
their contributions to the growth of material output.

This hidden

ideology in the new model seems to have stemmed in Japan from deep
disillusionment on the use of military power and sheer need for
escape from hunger and poverty immediately after World War II, in
addition to a century-long desire to catch up with the West.
Effectiveness of this model in terms of its catch-up goal has
been proved by the post-war history of East Asia.

As the failure

of centrally planned economies has become evident, attractiveness
of new developmental market economies has increased for developing
nations.

Economic reforms in China and India in the past ten years

appear to represent an effort to reorient their development model
from centrally planned to developmental market economies.
recent reform in Vietnam seems to go along this line.

Also,

This course

might be followed by some East European countries, too.
structure of New Confrontation

My historical perspective on the rise and fall of catch-up models
predicts the major axis of the new world system to be confrontation
between liberal market economies in North America and Western
Europe and new developmental market economies in East Asia and its
followers.

Compared with this major axis, other confrontations

even including the recent Gulf War are not really global but rather
local by nature, however severe and violent they may be, since
countries like Iraq have accidentally become rich enough to build
military power sufficient for seeking regional hegemony, but have
not developed an effective system of sustaining economic devel
opment with which they can challenge for world-wide hegemony.
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Unlike the confrontation between liberal market and centrally
planned economies, the new confrontation is not ideological but is
limited to conflicts in economic interests.

Yet, there is a danger

that this confrontation will escalate beyond the economic sphere.
As developmental market economies become successful in industrial
development,

they

begin

to

manufactured commodities.

compete

in

the

world

trade

of

If this speed is too fast and exceeds

the capacity of industrial adjustment on the side of advanced
economies,

it

tends

to

create

strong

protectionism within advanced countries.

political

demand

for

The real danger arises

when the protectionist bloc tries to achieve its political goal by
escalating economic conflicts to ideological confrontation.

Their

common strategy is to condemn advancement of developmental market
economies to the world market as based on "unfair" production and
trade practices, and to conclude these "unfair" practices as based
on

different

liberalism.

culture

and

ideology

from Western

democracy

and

On this ground, they argue that, since there is no

common ground

for

settlement

through rational

economies must be "contained" by force.

dialogue,

these

This is typical of the

arguments against "the Japanese System" of so-called "revisionists"
represented by James Fallows (1989), Chalmers Johnson (1982), Clyde
V. Prestowitz, Jr.

(1988) and Karel van Wolfaren (1989) . 6

If such a political maneuver to escalate the economic problem to
the ideological confrontation is successful,
popular

criticism from the

social/cultural

systems

of

it will result in

side of advanced economies
developmental

market

on the

economies.

Resulting external pressures for reforms in these systems will
evoke reactional nationalism on the other side.

If developmental

market economies may thus be pushed too hard, they may revert their
route to that followed by pre-war Germany and Japan.

On the other

hand, if developmental market economies shall be allowed to grow
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smoothly, their political systems which are now somewhat despotic
and

totalitarian

are

likely

to

move

toward

and

democracy

liberalism; this tendency is evident from the recent moves in Korea
and Taiwan.

Beyond Developmental Market Economies

It will add another major example to the stupidity of the human
race if advanced countries will chase out newly emerging nations
from the new to the old model of developmental market economies.
must

We

remember

how Weimar

democracy

in Germany

and

Taisho

democracy in Japan were massacred by economic blockism following
the World .oepressi;on.

Unless such stupidity shall be prevented

from recurring, the new world system will suffer the same fear and
waste as experienced under the cold war.
How can the new confrontation between liberal and developmental
market economies be structured so as to be constructive rather than
destructive?

In order to prevent the confrontation from turning

into a negative-sum game, both sides must be freed from mutual fear
and

distrust.

For that purpose,

clear understanding must

be

established that liberal and developmental market economies are not
really discontinuous.

It must be recognized that,

while

the

present system of Japan and Asian NIES might be unique, it may not
be quite so unique relative to "the American System" or "the German
System" in the nineteenth century.
Since the system of developmental market economies is a catch-up
model,

its positive role should end when the zeal of late-comer

countries for catching up to advanced will be satisfied.

If a

country would wish to further promote the economic welfare of its
people in a stage beyond the successful catch-up, the country must
transform itself from developmental to liberal market economies,
because the system which can best serve for consumers' (citizens')
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welfare

at

variations

a

high

in

income

stage

people's wants

is

characterized
nothing

but

by

the

increased

free

market

mechanism based on competition under transparent rules.
The best proof for continuity to exist between liberal and
developmental market economies will be Japan's transformation.
Japan was a forerunner of new developmental market economies and
was successful in achieving the catch-up goal almost two decades
ago.

Yet, its transformation into liberal market economies has

long been overdue.

As the result, the nation is now suffering from

serious international economic frictions as well as a large gap
between GNP and the quality of life.

Japan must be quick to

abandon the government regulations and administrative guidance that
are against the principle of consumer sovereignty, and thereby to
establish

the

free

market

system that

is

transparent

to

all

citizens and open to the world.
This

shift

identity.

does

not

mean

abandonment

of

Japan's

cultural

The prevailing government controls andregulations were

not necessarily rooted in the unique culture of Japan but were
mostly created

in the

catching up.

relatively recent past

as

a

device

of

Somewhat unique business organizations and trade

practices do exist that may appear to be strongly group-oriented
and non-individualistic to the eyes of westerners.

However, real

monopoly and inefficiency tend to arise where these group-oriented
organizations are reinforced by government controls.
controls

shall

be

removed,

some

of

the

Once those

apparently

unique

organizations and practices in Japan will disappear as they will
lose to competition in the free market if they are inconsistent
with the interests of consumers.
survive

through

originated

in

applicability

market
Japan's

and

Those institut ions that may

competition,
unique

contribute

even

culture,
to

if

they

might

will

have

universal

revitalization

of

the

be

world
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economy. 7

It must be recognized that the vitality of liberal

market economies, too, can not be maintained unless they continue
efforts for institutiona l and organization al innovations, sometimes
by

learning

from

other

cultures'

innovations,

in

response

to

changes in technology and people's preference.
Already it is late but it may not be too late for Japan to prove
by itself that,

upon successful catch-up,

developmenta l market

economies shift to liberal market economies.

If Japan accomplishes

this task,

fear and suspicion of advanced industrial countries

against late-comer countries based on the system of developmenta l
market

economies may be

Japanese

market

would

reduced.
increase

Also,

bold

confidence

developmenta l market economies on Japan.

opening

and

of

the

reliance

of

On the basis of increased

confidence and trust from the world, Japan should act as a bona

fide moderator between liberal and developmenta l market economies
so that their relation will turn out to be a positive-sum game.
If the world system instead falls into a negative-sum game, the
basis

of

Japan's

prosperity will

inevitably be

lost.

Public

awareness of this danger has not yet been sufficiently strong so as
to overcome the resistance of vested interest groups to the swift
shift

to

liberal

developmenta l

market

market

economies.

economies,

which

Indeed,
proved

the
to

be

system

of

extremely

successful for Japan in the past, has now been turning into its
fatal stumbling block.
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NOTES

1. Of course,

another requirement is the society's ability to

allocate the saving efficiently among alternative investment
opportunities so as to maximize the long-term growth rates of
national product.
2. In the

course

of

history this model

has

undergone major

modifications in North America and Western Europe including
England

itself

Keynesianism.
based

on

the

under
Yet,

the

tides

of

social

democracy

and

the model of liberal market economies

principles

of

equal

opportunities,

free

competition and consumer sovereignty has survived as an ideal
to bind economic policies in the western countries.
3. Moreover, it would not be an unfair statement that the model
of liberal market economies in early-comer countries such as
England and France was supported by the vast market in their
overseas colonies.
4. Several other catch-up models also failed before they became
major contenders to world economic hegemony.

For example, the

"Latin American model" as represented by Peronism, which is
considered

a

marriage

of

.

populism

with

the

model

of

development market economies, failed because producers' excess
profits

due

to

such

policies

as

import-substitution

industrialization were dissipated for consumption.
5. The structure and the working mechanism of this system have
been described from various angles, including Johnson (1982),
Yamamura and Yasuba (1987), Prestowitz (1988), Okimoto (1989),
and Yamamura (1990).

An interesting general characterization

of postwar economic policies in Japan is advanced in Yasusuke
Murakami's article (Yamamura and Yasuba, 1987, pp. 33-90).
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6. For a succinct restatement of their position,
Johnson, Prestowitz and van Wolfaren (1990).

see Fallows,

For a critical

review of revisionists' arguments and counter arguments, see
Yamamura (1990, pp. 13-64).
7. For the nature and significance of

intra- and

inter-firm

organizations in Japan, see Abegglen and Stalk (1985), Aoki
(1984a, 1984b, 1988), Imai, Itami and Koike (1982), and Imai
and Komiya (1989).

Thomas

c.

Smith (1988) provides a useful

perspective on how the unique industrial organization of Japan
had

stemmed

society.

from

the

organization

of

premodern

agrarian

